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Abstract
This paper discusses the position of the European Union in the world economy by focussing on innovation,
knowledge creation and technology policy. First, we explore and analyse the concept of knowledge and its
application in a modern Schumpeterian framework. Second, we address some new insights in the diffusion and other
properties of knowledge. Third, we focus on knowledge spillovers by investigating Dutch manufacturing. Thereafter,
we examine technology policy.
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Introduction
Science and Technology (S&T) and more recently formalized industrial Research and
Development (R&D) has been the subject of public interest and support for centuries. The
acceptance of a utilitarian argument for the public support of basic scientific research actually
predates the Industrial Revolution itself. It is impossible to review in this article the innumerable
contributions which have been made over the last decade on both the raison d’être and intrinsic
limits of public support for S&T and R&D in particular. However, there is little doubt that some
broad trends can be identified, not in the least because of the development of new, what could
be called ‘post national’, European institutions governing S&T and R&D support in particular.
At the same time a significant shift in the purpose and nature of such policies has occurred. From
an early trend towards centralized public support for ‘big science’ areas often considered of
strategic importance: military research, (atomic) energy research, aeronautics, support shifted
within the framework of the notion of so-called ‘pre-competitive’ research support to new sunrise
sectors such as microelectronics. More recently, it could be argued that a shift occurred in the
nature of the public support away from technology push support towards more demand pull
programs, with greater acceptance of the crucial role of users and the intrinsic recognition that
technical success does not necessarily imply economic success. The European Commission’s
recent Green Book on Innovation provides probably the most explicit recognition of the need for
this shift towards innovation policies describing Europe’s failure in developing new products and
new technology based firms as a European technology paradox: excellence and strength in basic
and fundamental research yet failure to translate this in commercial excellence and success.1
In this short article we cannot go into much detail into the development and formal organization
of European technology policy. There is now a voluminous literature on this subject, not in the
least from the European Commission itself.  We limit ourselves here to a brief overview in a first2
section to some of the most significant features and aspects of this new, post-national innovation
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system. The focus of  our paper is rather on the more fundamental shift in both academic and
policy making circles in the direction of recognizing the crucial role of the broader notion of
knowledge creation and diffusion for economic growth and international competitiveness. This
‘new’ economics of knowledge creation and diffusion is the focal point of section 2 of the paper.
It implies, a growing recognition that technical change is in our current highly developed, open
societies a complex dynamic process that involves many social and economic factors and a wide
range of individuals, institutions and firms. The capacity of an economy to derive competitive
advantages from technical change and innovation is in the end dependent on the dynamic
efficiency with which firms and institutions can diffuse, adapt, and apply information and
knowledge. 
From this perspective the current debate on science, technology and innovation policy will have
to recognize to a much larger extent some of the new structural features of what is now largely
recognized as the trend of our societies towards a knowledge based economy. This renewed
recognition of the importance of ‘knowledge’ is based as we argue in section 2 on three factors.
It raises some fundamental new policy challenges which can in our view, and as argued, best be
answered using more explicitly some Schumpeterian concepts based on both contributions from
New Growth Theory (NGT) and as well as on more appreciative, structural descriptions of
sectoral technological developments represented for instance in Richard Nelson’s recent
Tinbergen lecture.3
In Section 3, we then turn to some econometric facts for the Netherlands by first analyzing
knowledge spillovers and second by investigating the internalization of these spillovers, and in
particular the contribution of  European spillovers. The latter are of particular importance given
the purpose of European technology policies to provide room for economies of scope and scale
in S&T and R&D in particular. Moreover, the search for internalization of R&D efforts point
towards the need of alternative modes of institutional development and learning, not in the least
at the international, European level. In this regard we follow the contributions by Weder and
Grubel (1993) and Romer (1993), evaluating the institutional technology environment within the
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European Union (EU) in which there is both scope for the internalization of R&D and the
stimulation of cross-border, joint R&D efforts. 
We conclude by proposing a new framework for European technology policy. 
1. The emergence of an European post-national S&T system
Both the early literature on NSIs and the more recent interpretation of the concept by David and
Foray (1995) bring to the forefront the wide diversity of national policy instruments in the S&T
area. While some of these might have been characterized by general notions that were ‘mission’
or ‘diffusion’ oriented (e.g. Ergas (1987)), recent literature suggests that such understandings
hide much of the institutional nature of these systems and hence do not lead the policy debate
very far. The notion of some internationally valid ‘best practice’ institutional mechanism in the
S&T area seems from this perspective not justified.
This raises some fundamental questions about the convergence of the various national S&T
systems, and the possibilities for the emergence of an ‘European S&T system’. The wide
diversity across the EU member states in the amount of resources devoted to research, the
structure of those resources, the importance of industry/university relationships and the
institutional organisational set-up of government support  warrant a much closer look at the S&T4
policies followed in the various EU member states. The latter are to a large extent shaped by a
long and in some countries rich history of S&T institutions and different administrative
traditions. Despite the variety in institutional structures governing S&T policy, there is
nevertheless evidence for convergence in the objectives of such policies and their implementation
mechanisms, if only because most countries appear to be confronted with similar budgetary
pressures and concerns.
EU integration has by now a history of more than forty years. It has led to the development of a
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number of simultaneous or lagging convergence processes, creating a post-national ‘layer’ of
activities for national firms and governments. Johnson and Gregersen (1995) define European
integration as “a process towards a coherent institutional setup for production, trade and
innovation within Europe.” They identify four interrelated types of economic integration in a
matrix. These types are (i) formal and (ii) informal institutional arrangements between political
actors, and (iii) formal and (iv) informal institutional arrangements between economic actors. We
concentrate on type (i), formal EU institutions, and type (iv), changes in the informal institutional
set-up and communication pattern among private agents, e.g., through networking.5
The development of European integration from the European Steel and Coal Community (ESCC)
to the EU has led to the setting up of a number of original post-national institutions which have
contributed significantly to shaping the innovation process in the different European member
states. These institutions can be called ‘post-national’ for two reasons. First, they have created
stable links between the main actors and existing organizations which have contributed to the
fabric of NSIs and have been supported by specific new organizations; and second, they have not
replaced national institutions which continue to determine the specifics of NSIs.
Despite their wide and diverse coverage, most institutions created over the last forty years within
the framework of European integration can be related directly to the three essential components
of knowledge infrastructure: Research and technological development (RTD), innovation
transfer, and training and education. Furthermore, despite the impression of a relatively recent
emergence of such institutions, they can be traced back to the early failure to implement, under
the Euratom Treaty, an European division of labour of nuclear research. Hence these institutions
have combined elements of federalism (where sovereignty and the regulation of human
interaction has been displaced at a supranational level) with elements of intergovernmental
cooperation (where national institutions are interlinked while remaining truly autonomous). Thus,
in Europe the institutional building process has been the result of very diverse social, political,
and economic processes which explains its heterogeneity and also its specific character.
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We have, in other words, a market tending towards unification, regulated by well-defined
competition and trade policy rules with emerging (research, innovation, regional development)
structural policy institutions. This emerging post-national system of innovation produces, and is
produced by, specific post-national institutions that are both formal (treaties, community
programs, and other European schemes) and informal (networks, common habits, and norms).
One can assume that the core of a system of innovation at the European level is made of those
organizations and institutions regulating the creation, diffusion and use of knowledge and know-
how in cooperation across member states’ boundaries; i.e., organizations and institutions
dedicated to research, innovation, and education and training. Other structural policy institutions,
although they often include a very significant innovation component, are not considered here
because they are not primarily designed for contributing to the emergence of a post-national
innovation space but rather for strengthening NSIs in less favoured countries and in specific
regions.
The Treaty of the EU defines the rules governing research, innovation, and education/training
institutions. In the field of research, Title XV defines the objectives, the actions that can be
carried out, the decision-making procedures, and the implementation mechanisms. Innovation
is only quoted in the title concerning industry where it is said that the Community aims at
favouring a better exploitation of the industrial potential of innovation policies. Finally, a
distinction is made in the treaty between education for which no real policy is mentioned (only
Community action) and training which is the subject of a true EC policy.
Research institutions have a longer history. They promote transnational cooperation in the field
of the production of knowledge and know-how and its diffusion across Europe. The Fourth
Framework Program (1994-1998) and related specific programs are now key components
together with competition rules governing state aids and cooperation agreements between firms.6
Innovation policy institutions, if conceived in a restrictive manner as specific formal rules
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influencing the innovation capacity of firms beyond R&D and technological demonstration, do
not exist at the EU level. Support programs for innovation and technology transfer, however, can
be considered as quasi-institutions in so far as they have influenced the behaviour of specific
actors in the innovation process, i.e. the wider category of intermediaries working in the field of
technology transfer and application in SMEs. The Strategic Program for Innovation and
Technology Transfer (SPRINT) is an embryo of such innovation policy institutions. From 1989
to 1994 it contributed to the development of innovation support services for SMEs, to the
demonstration of intra-Community technology transfer and technology acquisition, and to the
improvement of a common European awareness of the innovation process.
Education and training institutions, although they were partly (for training only) foreseen by the
EEC Treaty in the provisions related to the European Social Fund, have been created by the
Treaty of the EU. The new rules formalize previous ad hoc experimentation through Community
programs. For example, the experience of COMETT is very interesting from the point of view
of nascent training institutions at the European level.
Up to now, it could be argued that the European institutions have been primarily developed in
support of an emerging ‘knowledge-producing’ national European innovation system. In doing
so they have focussed on the realisation of essential complementarities with respect to more
traditional EU economies of scale or harmonisation aims: (i) the Single Market, (ii) liberalisation,
transparency and establishment of common competition rules, (iii) targeting of strategic
industries considered crucial for competitiveness, and (iv) support for R&D activities of large
EU multinationals. As we will argue in the next section, the new, fundamental policy challenge
for Europe could be viewed as the enhancement and development of the ‘distributive’ innovation
capacity at an European level: the creation and strengthening of an European institutional set up
based on a more ‘diversity-connectivity’ network approach to the various existing poles in
Europe of technological specialisation and expertise. How such a system could interact with
national, regional and local systems of innovation so as to interconnect local competences; how
to support new ventures, new businesses and new modes of organisation and learning are
examples of issues we come back to in our conclusions.
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Schumpeterian approaches is given in Aghion and Howitt (1998).
2. The ‘new’ economics of innovation and knowledge creation
The concept of technological progress, through innovating activities and knowledge creation, as
the main engine for economic growth, is not a new one in economics. Its importance was already
stressed and at the core of economic thinking from the late eighteenth century on. We only have
to consider the dominant role given to technological progress by classical economists such as
Karl Marx or this century by Joseph Schumpeter, to realise that economists have always been
aware of the crucial importance of innovation and knowledge accumulation for long-term
growth.  However, three features seem to be the basis of the current, renewed importance given7
to knowledge for economic growth and welfare.
First, the economic profession has started to recognize the fact that knowledge accumulation can
be analysed like the accumulation of any other capital good. That one can apply economic
principles to the production and exchange of knowledge; that it is intrinsically endogenous to the
economic and the social system and is not an external, black box factor, not to be opened except
by scientists and engineers. Hence, while knowledge has some specific features of its own, it can
be produced and used in the production of other goods, even in the production of itself, like any
other capital good that is used as an input in the production process. It also can be stored and will
be subject to depreciation, when skills deteriorate or people no longer use particular knowledge
and forget about it. It might even become obsolete, when new knowledge supersedes and renders
it worthless.
However, there are some fundamental differences with traditional material capital goods. First,
and foremost, the production of knowledge will not take the form of a physical piece of
equipment, but is generally embedded in some specific blueprint form (a patent, an artefact, a
design, a software program, a manuscript, a composition) or in human beings or even in
organisations. In each of these cases there will be so-called positive externalities: the knowledge
embodied in such blueprints, people or organisations cannot be fully appropriated, it will with
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little cost to the knowledge creator flow away to other firms or to the public knowledge stock.
Knowledge is, from this perspective, a non-rival good. It can be shared by many people without
diminishing in any way the amount available to any one of them. Of course there are costs in
acquiring knowledge; a research department working on innovative projects is certainly not
cheap. Therefore, a current central theme coming to the surface in economic theory is what is
referred to as information asymmetry: the person wanting to buy something from someone who
knows more about it, obviously suffers from an asymmetry in information.
This explains why markets for the exchange of knowledge are rare and why most firms have
preferred to carry out innovative activities ‘inhouse’ rather than have it contracted out or
licensed; a lot of the knowledge created must be appropriated in order to prevent direct spillover
effects to competitors from happening. However, once knowledge is available at no single cost,
no firm has an incentive to acquire knowledge at any cost. It also provides a rationale for policies
focussing on the importance of investment in knowledge accumulation, as we discuss later on.
Such investments are likely to have high so-called social rates of return -- because of its non-
rivalry properties and the easiness with respect to spillover effects -- often much higher than the
private rate of return. Hence, investment in knowledge cannot be simply left to a competitive
market environment.
Second, the growing economic and policy consensus on the importance of knowledge for
industrial competitiveness is closely related to the emergence of a cluster of new information and
communication technologies (ICTs), which have resulted in a dramatic decline in the price of
information processing; in a technological driven digital convergence between communication
and computer technology; and last, but not least, a rapid growth in international electronic
networking.
ICTs are in the real sense of the word an information technology (IT), the essence of which
consists of the increased memorisation and storage, speed, manipulation and interpretation of
data and information. In short, it is what has been characterized as the codification of information
and knowledge. As a consequence, IT makes codified knowledge, data and information much
more accessible than before to all sectors and agents in the economy linked to information
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networks or with the knowledge how to access such networks. This is not to deny the importance
of tacit knowledge; on the contrary, as more and more knowledge becomes codifiable, the
remaining non-codifiable part becomes even more crucial.
Thus, the ability to codify relevant knowledge in creative ways acquires strategic value and will
affect competitiveness at all levels. Network access as well as the competence to sort out the
relevant information and to use it for economic purposes become of critical importance for
performance and income distribution. Specific skills, referring to the use of information, become
of strategic importance. More routine skills, by contrast, might become totally codifiable and
their importance might be reduced dramatically.  While the idea of ICTs as a skill-biased8
technical change, does not consequently capture very well the complexities of the accompanying
required de- and reskilling processes, it points nevertheless to the importance of the distributional
impact of ICTs.
As a consequence of the increased potential for international codification and transferability,
ICTs can be considered as the first truly global technology. The possibility of ICTs to codify
information and knowledge over both distance and time, brings about more global access.
Knowledge, including economic knowledge becomes to some extent globally available. While
the local capacities to use or have the competence to access such knowledge will vary widely,
the access potential is there. ICTs, in other words, brings to the forefront the enormous potential
for catching-up, based upon cost advantages and economic transparency of (dis)advantages,
while stressing at the same time the crucial tacit and other competence elements in the capacity
to access international codified knowledge. For technologically leading countries or firms, this
implies increasing erosion of monopoly rents associated with innovation and shortening of
product life cycles. We observe less and less appropriability due to global access to ICTs, which
might lead to less innovative activities as the self-reinforcing positive loop from successful
innovation to increased innovative activities becomes shorter and more competitive due to this
globalization. Research efforts may not be profitable anymore in this setting, when we analyse
a single firm. However, associations, conglomerates or industry clusters might be able to
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internalize these externalities, as we will show in the next section.
Furthermore, globalization does not merely represent an extension of opportunities from the
national to the EU or global level. It also generates new constraints. Applications of information
related technologies at the national level will need to be fully compatible with international
trends to avoid the risk of cut-off from vital economic flows. Progress in the ability of firms to
customize production will paradoxically multiply the number of mini-markets within the global
market, and thus require new marketing skills and new types of interaction with customers. The
security of the new world networks acquires strategic importance. Beyond the new legal
framework that is required, the operation of international information flows in real time will need
to be based on relations of trust between partners that will directly affect the distribution of tasks
within firms and between firms. This might reduce the ability of each economic actor to innovate
single-handedly in certain key areas, and stresses the important (future) role of strong technology
clusters and government investment in knowledge.
Third, we would argue that the perception of the nature of innovation processes has also changed
significantly over the last decade. Broadly speaking, innovation capability is seen less in terms
of the ability to discover new technological principles, and more in terms of the ability to exploit
systematically the effects produced by new combinations and use of pieces in the existing stock
of knowledge. This new model implies to some extent more routine use of a technological base
allowing innovation without the need for leaps in technology. It requires systematic access to the
state-of-the-art technologies; each industry must introduce procedures for the dissemination of
information regarding the stock of technologies available, so that individual innovators can draw
upon the work of other innovators. To stimulate this trend, industry clusters of innovation or
NSIs can be useful in combining and exploring existing knowledge into new products and/or
technology standards and skills to secure future economic growth. This mode of knowledge
generation -- based on the recombination and re-use of known practices -- raises also much more
information-search problems and must confront the problems of the impediments to accessing
the existing stock of information that are created by intellectual property right laws.9
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competition, particularly innovative and imitative strategies and their influence on the evolution of industrial
structures, while the latter extended this model with endogenous entry and adaptive R&D strategies of firms, which
emphasized the main characteristics of Schumpeter Mark I and Schumpeter Mark II technological regimes.
The S&T system is, in other words, shifting towards a more complex socially distributed
structure of knowledge production activities, involving in particular a great diversity of
organizations having an explicit goal of producing knowledge (learning entities). The old system
by contrast, was based on a simple dichotomy between deliberate learning and knowledge
generation (R&D laboratories and universities) and activities of production and consumption
where the motivation for acting was not to acquire new knowledge but rather to produce or use
effective outputs. The collapse (or partial collapse) of this dichotomy conducts to a proliferation
of new places having the explicit goal of producing knowledge and undertaking deliberate
research activities, which may not be readily observable but nevertheless essential to sustain
innovative activities in a global environment.
This shift in perception brings in many ways to the forefront the importance of the distinction
made by Schumpeter between two different technological regimes through which the innovative
process, which enhances, induces and possibly accelerates economic growth, takes place.10
The first approach -- in the literature defined as the Schumpeter Mark I regime -- lays emphasis
on the innovating entrepreneur who observes possibilities for the introduction of new products,
and subsequently enters in this so-called niche of some market. By entering in this niche, the
entrepreneur challenges the incumbent firm and hence the existing leading-edge technology
and/or product. This process of quality improving or vertical innovation, that itself results from
(uncertain) research initiatives, is called creative destruction. The notion of creative destruction
has by definition the natural property that new inventions make the leading-edge technology
and/or products obsolete, which more or less forces the incumbent firm to withdraw from the
market. This market, in a Schumpeter Mark I regime, is characterized by many small firms who
use the ‘public basin’ of existing knowledge or the general and easy accessable knowledge stock
to innovate, while the knowledge created by their invention is added to this public basin and used
by the next entrepreneur to challenge the incumbent, and so on. This description of affairs
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contrasts the other regime described by Schumpeter.
Schumpeter’s second approach -- which is labelled Schumpeter Mark II regime -- considers
innovative activities conducted by large and established firms. The process of innovative
activities of these firms is often called creative accumulation, because when large firms
successfully innovate, they often appropriate the main part of their invention (instead of being
forced to add their newly acquired knowledge to the public basin), which leads to a strong
positive feedback loop from innovation to increased R&D activities. This self-reinforcing process
is mainly due to the high level of appropriability because firms prevent their innovation from
imitation and hence appropriate the profits from an innovation to the largest extent possible.
Notable devices in this regard are patents, secrecy, lead times, costs and time required for
duplication, learning curve effects, superior sales efforts, and differential technical efficiency due
to scale economies. 
Another argument in favour of the positive feedback loop is the high degree of cumulativeness.
In this respect cumulativeness refers to the extent to which innovations are serially correlated and
it clearly depends on whether technological progress depends and moves on with the currently
applied technology. Moreover, cumulativeness is a good example of learning by doing. Thus,
whereas the incumbent entrepreneur in a Schumpeter Mark I regime is forced to withdraw in case
of a new leading-edge technology, the incumbent firm in a Schumpeter Mark II can build on past
experience. Finally, the Schumpeter Mark II regime improves the market position of the
innovating firm and hence creative accumulation leads to high degrees of concentration, whereas
creative destruction leads to a competitive market environment.11
Labour
Universities etc.
Public Knowlegde
Sector-specific Innovations
Internmediate
Goods
Final Output
Public Good
(used in all sectors)
Technology Spillovers
(from innovations in all sectors)
Knowledge from Universities
Skilled Labour from Universities
Degree of
Appropriability
Manufacturing
Labour
Sector-specific Research
[1999] Innovation, knowledge creation and technology policy in Europe 13
 For simplicity we omit capital.12
Figure 1
A Schematic Presentation of Economic Activities in a Schumpeterian Setting
Source: Adapted from Aghion and Howitt (1998)
Figure 1 gives us a basic schematic presentation of economic activities in a Schumpeterian
environment.  This figure shows us that a firm possibly splits its labour force in a research12
department and a manufacturing division. In the research department, workers are supposed to
invent new products and/or technology standards, while workers in the manufacturing division
produce intermediate goods, that are used to create the final output of the particular firm.
Sector-specific innovations are induced and occur because of the effort of the firm’s research
department on the one hand, and public knowledge from the public basin on the other hand. Once
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a firm has invented a new product and/or technology standard, it depends on the degree of
appropriability whether the knowledge used to innovate spills over to the public knowledge basin
or not. In the case of a Schumpeter Mark I regime all benefits from the innovation spill over to
the public knowledge basin. It is therefore that firms in this regime have no incentive to innovate,
once they are at the leading-edge; the degree of appropriability is (almost) zero. In a Schumpeter
Mark II regime, the degree of appropriability can be fairly high. Large firms often patent their
innovations, while their innovations take much time and large effort to duplicate and/or imitate.
Hence, direct technology spillovers are not to be expected from large firms to the extent they are
observed in a Schumpeter Mark I regime.
Public knowledge is also enhanced by research performed at universities and other research
institutes. Their output in the form of knowledge is often published in scientific journals or
transmitted by channels such as conferences. This improves the overall knowledge stock in the
economy and induces innovative activities. Moreover, universities educate individuals that enter
sooner or later labour force. By means of education the labour force becomes more productive
because individuals obtain a higher skill level. These skills can be applied in both the
manufacturing division and the research department of the firm. By employing skilled
individuals, labour productivity levels are supposed and expected to increase. This in turn leads
to higher levels of innovative activities in the research department, on the one hand, and higher
levels production in the manufacturing division, on the other. Of course, these skilled individuals
can also be employed at the universities themselves. Employing them at universities leads to a
direct positive effect on the stock of public knowledge, while employing skilled individuals at
firms or in the business sector leads to possible indirect effects on the stock of public knowledge
through the effort put in innovative activities at the firm level.13
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3. National, European and international knowledge spillovers
It will be clear from the previous analysis that the creation of knowledge will be characterized
by significant spillovers: the knowledge created will not be fully appropriated and will flow to
other firms in the same sector, to other using sectors, and of course to other countries. From a
Schumpeterian perspective such spillovers have often been identified with the notion of clusters
of innovations, including the follow-up innovations made during the diffusion period. Elsewhere,
it is argued that the clustering of such radical innovations can be linked to the rapid growth of
new industries and, in the extreme case, can even provide ingredients of an upswing in overall
economic growth.  At the more formal level, econometric studies have established how such14
R&D spillovers play a significant role in explaining economic growth.15
In this regard, spillovers from one sector or country to the other, generated in the process of
performing R&D, have gained much attention recently.  Griliches (1992) defines in his analysis,16
on the one hand, rent spillovers generated by international trade and, on the other hand,
knowledge spillovers generated by blue prints like patent information, scientific literature and
imitation. Particularly the latter is of main importance for our analysis here. In the remainder of
this section we first explore and stress the importance of the impact of knowledge spillovers on
labour productivity. Second, we turn to the analysis of internalizing R&D efforts by means of
associations, conglomerates and industry clusters.
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Lj, t
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'IRDj, t
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IROTj, t
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 The following twenty two sectors are included in our analysis (ISIC code between brackets): Food, beverages,17
tobacco (31), Textiles, leather, footwear (32), Wood and wooden products (33), Printing and publishing (34),
Chemicals excl. pharmaceuticals (351+352-3522), Pharmaceuticals (3522), Refined oil and related products
(353+354), Rubber and plastic products (355+356), Glass, stone and clay (36), Ferrous basic metals (371), Non-
ferrous basic metals (372), Simple metal products (381), Machinery (382-3825), Computers and office machines
(3825), Electrical goods (383-3832), Radio, TV, telecommunication equipment and electronic components (3832),
Ships and boats (3841), Automobiles (3843), Aerospace (3845), Other transport equipment (384-3841-3843-3845),
Instruments (385) and Other manufacturing (39).
(1a)
(1b)
We use the so-called ‘technology flow matrix’, developed in Verspagen (1997a) and (1997b),
to describe knowledge flows from the knowledge producing to the knowledge consuming sectors.
As an example, we explore the Dutch manufacturing sector from 1973 to 1995 (the latest year
for which data are available). The purpose of this analysis is to show how knowledge created in
one particular sector -- either domestic or foreign -- is applied and used in the Dutch economy.
This analysis gives us both a clear picture of the knowledge flows within the Dutch
manufacturing sector and the dimension or degree to which imported knowledge is having an
impact.
The analysis is built on the following simple Cobb-Douglas production functions
and
where subscript j refers to sector j and t is the time indicator. The data used refer all to
manufacturing sectors and are taken from the OECD STAN, ANBERD and BITRA databases.17
Y is defined as value added generated in the production process, A is a scale variable, K is the
capital stock, L the amount of labour used in the production process, RD the knowledge created
and applied in sector j, IRD is the knowledge available from the public knowledge basin in the
Netherlands, IREU is the knowledge available from the public knowledge basin in the EU, IROT
from the rest of the world and IRF is the sum of IREU and IROT, i.e. indirect knowledge
Kt 
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 The initial capital and knowledge stocks are defined in the following manner K  = (I )/ (Q + 0.05) and RD  =18 0  K,1      0
(I )/ (3 + 0.05). This is in line with definitions suggested in Griliches (1980).RD,1
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5a)
(5b)
spillovers from abroad. The parameters , , ’, , 1, , )  are the elasticities with respect to each
of them.
The capital and knowledge stock are determined by using the perpetual inventory method; i.e.
and
where Q and 3 are the depreciation rates with respect to the capital and knowledge stock,
respectively, while I  and I  are defined as the (annual) investments in both stocks. WithK,t   RD,t
regard to the capital stock a depreciation rate of 5% and with regard to the knowledge stock we
assume a depreciation rate of 15% is taken into account.18
The indirect knowledge stocks are constructed using the technology flow matrix. The domestic
indirect knowledge stock for sector k is defined as
and the foreign knowledge stocks for the same sector are defined as
IRFk 
 M
F
M
j
7jkRDFjsFjmj
y	 l 
 a  (k	 l)  l  ’(rd	 l)   ird   ireu  ) irot
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 It is important to note that the diagonal of the technology flow matrix with respect to the calculation of the19
domestic knowledge stock is put at zero to exclude the problem of multicollinearity, i.e. 7  = 0.jj
 Note that  =  +  + ' - 1. If  = 0 we observe constant returns to scale with regard to sector j’s own production20
factors.
(5c)
(6a)
(6b)
and
where IREU + IROT = IRF. In these four equations 7  is defined as the part of R&D performedjk
by sector j that spills over to sector k and m  is the import share of sector j.  In equations (5a),j 19
(5b) and (5c) EU, OT and F are the number of trading partners that are taken into consideration.
Due to data limitations, these partners included in set F are Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Spain, Sweden, UK and US. EU-countries are included
in the set EU, while non-EU-countries are put in set OT. The variable labelled s  gives the importFj
share of sector j in the Netherlands from country F.
Finally, equation (1a) and (1b) are rewritten in log-form in order to perform the estimations. This
is done by dividing every variable, except IRD, IREU, IROT and IRF, by L and subsequently
taking logarithms. This leads to equations (6a) and (6b) which are subject to further econometric
estimation:
and
to which an error term is added.20
The database constructed to estimate equation (6a) and (6b) is a panel database. Hence we use
the so-called ‘within’ regression method. This method is in essence an OLS-regression in which
per sector the average value of the variable is subtracted from the variable’s actual value. The
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 For an elaboration on this regression method (and other regression methods) we refer the reader to Greene (1997).21
reason to use the ‘within’ regression method is that it gives a strong and comprehensive picture
of the development over time; in this case 1973-1995.  The results of the regressions are21
displayed in Table 1.
Table 1
Estimation Results
 '  1  )  R  adj.2
k - l rd - l ird irf ireu irot l
1 0,402 0,060 0,050 0,424
2 0,311 0,075 0,155 0,064 0,438
3 0,230 0,064 0,153 -0,012 0,475
4 0,186 0,072 0,100 0,142 0,002 0,480
5 0,196 0,067 0,159 0,030 -0,039 0,487
6 0,169 0,073 0,068 0,142 0,035 -0,240 0,489
(12,184) (2,423) (0,944)
(7,471) (3,001) (3,507) (1,234)
(5,675) (2,687) (6,720) (-0,220)
(4,139) (3,028) (2,216) (6,097) (0,047)
(4,579) (2,867) (4,233) (0,975) (-0,747)
(3,772) (3,068) (1,534) (3,611) (1,148) (-0,467)
Note: t-values in brackets
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First of all results of regressions are presented without taking into account knowledge spillovers.
This results in a coefficient for  of approximately 40%, which is above the for the Netherlands
usual value of 30%. The effect of the knowledge stock (Table 1, second line) on labour
productivity is positive and statistically significant: 6% (t-value 2,423). If domestic indirect
knowledge spillovers are introduced, it turns out that the capital/labour ratio is in line with the
expected 30%. Note that the elasticities of the domestic knowledge stock are twice as large as
the elasticities of the sector’s own knowledge stock, indicating the importance of the public
knowledge basin for labour productivity. This observation indirectly supports the scope for
government intervention by means of e.g. university funding and providing education to develop
skills along the lines of the arguments presented in Figure 1.
In the third regression -- in which the sum of knowledge spillovers from both the EU and the rest
of the world (IRF) to the Netherlands is taken into account -- a significant effect of imported
knowledge on labour productivity is found: the coefficient 1 has a value of 0.153 with a
significant t-value of 6,720. Moreover, this effect is larger than the effect of the sector’s own
knowledge stock on labour productivity. Next, we estimate the whole model. The results (Table
1, fourth line) show that knowledge spillovers are of central importance to Dutch manufacturing.
The spillover coefficients are of great prominence in explaining the accumulation of income and
labour productivity.
An interesting point to investigate is whether foreign knowledge spillovers basically the a result
of EU knowledge spillovers or not. The fifth and sixth regression in Table 1 show that knowledge
spillovers from the EU are highly significant. The coefficients  have a value of 15.9% and
14.2%, respectively, pointing at significant spillovers from the EU-countries to the Netherlands.
Knowledge spillovers from the rest of the world to the Netherlands turn out to be insignificant,
pointing towards the importance of the EU as a knowledge block in the world economy, for a
small open EU economy such as the Netherlands.
Furthermore, the results presented here suggest that for a small economy such as the Netherlands,
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 Note that in all four regressions  = 0 cannot be rejected.22
these benefits are primarily derived from R&D efforts performed in other EU-countries.  These22
results are in line with the estimation results of Griliches (1992), Verspagen (1997b) and Keller
(1998); Keller finds that benefits derived from foreign R&D in the same industry are in the order
of 50 to 95% of the productivity effect of own R&D. 
In general, the results stress the importance of R&D efforts and R&D spillovers for productivity
growth. However, the results also suggest that knowledge easily spills over from one sector and
one country to another, pointing to the difficulties in internalising the fruits of innovating
activities. Such internalisation within an industry cluster can be enhanced through the setting up
of institutions, aiming at internalising some of the these knowledge spillovers in particular those
linked to sectoral R&D efforts. 
Both Romer (1993) and Weder and Grubel (1993) have shown that, from a Coasean economics
point of view, there exists a tendency for the creation of institutions to reduce the possible
under-investment in R&D by reducing the size of the externalities and hence the need for
government policies to correct the market failure caused by the non-rivalness characteristics of
knowledge. Weder and Grubel investigate three different institutions based on Porter (1990): (i)
associations, that function like a club; (ii) conglomerates, consisting of firms that by output or
input characteristics belong to different industries but take advantage of joint R&D interests; and
(iii) industry clusters, that profit from a variety of positive feedback loops and spillovers which
individual companies enjoy due to the activities of other firms in the cluster. Romer (1993) on
the other hand pleas for improving collective action, including institutional development and
learning, to enhance economic growth. What he has in mind is a so-called limited liability
corporation, an invention that would not have been viable without the emergence of supporting
regulatory and legal institutions. In both analyses the selection of institutions, however, has to
be left to the market because the market is best capable of selecting the channels and institutions
that stimulate the effort put in the process of new inventions that ultimately drive economic
growth.
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Policy Conclusions
From the outset the European economic integration process was accompanied by a set of specific
industrial and technological policies, fostering intra-European cooperation in the field of
pre-competitive R&D, university researchers, students, and various support programmes for
particular technology fields: the so-called framework programmes and other related technological
support programmes. Interestingly, these policies that aimed at strengthening European
competitiveness in high tech sectors have probably been most successful in some of the ‘big
science’ RTD areas, where essential scale economies could indeed be achieved. In most other
areas though, the EU resources available when compared to national resources were too limited
to make any impact in shifting or redirecting countries’ own national priorities in supporting
investment in knowledge accumulation (both education, training and research). At the same time,
the international accessibility to codified knowledge increased dramatically through the use of
ICTs. While support for intra-European research collaboration might still be welcome in many
cases, the essential research collaboration will often be of a much more global nature, going well
beyond the European borders. There could even be a case of knowledge acquisition ‘diversion’,
the intra-European exchange having taken place at the expense of extra-European exchange. In
the more basic research areas where open international access has always existed, such
‘diversion’ might have ultimately had little impact; in the more applied business research areas,
it might well have been one of the factors behind the growth in so-called ‘strategic alliances’
between large European, US and Japanese firms trying to source knowledge more globally while
at the same time benefiting from various national or supra-national support programmes. It is
what could be called the European technology policy paradox: as Europe invested in
intra-European research, in the collaboration and exchange of scientific knowledge among
European scientists, or even in the technological strengthening of the competitive potential of
European firms, the advantages of such geographically ‘bounded’ collaboration have increasingly
become marginal, given the dramatically increased opportunities for the fast exchange of
information and cooperation.   
As we saw in the second section of this paper, there is now growing recognition that knowledge,
both as an input and output, is central to the process of growth and wealth accumulation. As a
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recent OECD document (OECD (1996)) puts it: “A Knowledge in all it forms plays today a
crucial role in economic processes. Intangible investment is growing much more rapidly than
physical investment. Firms with more knowledge are winners on markets. Nations endowed with
more knowledge are more competitive. Individuals with more knowledge get better paid jobs.
This strategic role is at the root of increasing investments by individuals, firms and nations in all
forms of knowledge.” In short, most contemporary developed economies are and have
increasingly become ‘knowledge-based’.
NGT has recognized the crucial role of knowledge accumulation in the growth process. Without
technological change, capital accumulation will not be sustained -- its marginal productivity
declining -- and the equilibrium (per capita) growth of the economy will inexorably tend towards
zero. It are the inventions of new machines and intermediate goods which provide the
opportunities for new investment. Thus, as has been shown in many empirical studies, the
efficiency gains following the introduction, diffusion and continuous improvements of new
production processes, have been the major factor behind the rise in income over the post-war
period in most developed economies.
The recognition of the importance of this broader notion of knowledge accumulation is
challenging the traditionally segmented ‘market failure’ policy approach to S&T support. As
argued in section 2, from this broader approach policies with regard to technological chance
encompass not just R&D, but the whole spectrum of scientific and technological activities from
invention to diffusion, from basic research to technological mastery. Such a view of
technological change rejects the orthodox economics definition of technological capabilities in
terms of ‘information’ with the connotation that industrial technology is like a recipe; understood
by particular individuals and readily articulatable and communicable from one individual to
another with the requisite background training. From a Schumpeterian perspective, what is
written down -- the recipe, the textbook discussion, the patent -- provides a start, but only in the
sense that a recipe provides a start. Knowing how to produce a product, is as much experienced
tacit skill as articulatable knowledge. And contrary to the implicit general theory the tacit skills
of one ‘skilled in the art’ are not ‘interchangable’: who works with the recipe makes a difference.
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But as argued in section 3, the more open, international technology environment of the end of this
Century confronts most EU economies with new, fundamental challenges in the science,
technology and innovation area, not in the least because of the crucial importance of sectoral and
international knowledge spillovers. While EU spillovers appear from this perspective, as was
illustrated in the case of The Netherlands essential, it does not imply of course that current
technology institutions both in individual EU Member Countries and at the EU supra-national
level, in their priority setting, design and implementation are particularly well suited and effective
in responding to some of the new policy challenges identified in section 2.
It is not the place here to try to answer this question. Rather to highlight, that in the end little is
known about the effectiveness of the various science, technology and innovation policies and
institutions implemented in the EU. Whereas at the national level many detailed analyses have
been carried out evaluating and monitoring particular policy instruments and hence assisting
policy makers in continuous institutional learning, we are particularly concerned with the
response (or rather lack of response) of European technology policies to the new policy
challenges raised above. 
Thus, and keeping in mind that this is by and large a non-exhaustive list, the question can be
raised whether the concept of ‘pre-competitive research’, popular in many European S&T
policies, is still of any relevance to the more systemic way in which S&T appear to interact today,
or whether the ‘pre-competitive’ concept has actually reinforced the emergence of a European
‘research paradox’ with public support for those research activities for which applications could
not be thought of. Similarly, the question can be raised whether the 50/50 principle of
public/private support has not practically automatically led to the substitution of private R&D
funding of the least profitable R&D activities, furthest removed from individual firms= core
R&D and competitive strength areas; just as the 100% principle in the case of universities or
public research laboratories might have led to substitution of national funds for EU Framework
Programme funds. Similarly, and interacting with the broader aims of social cohesion, the
question can be raised whether the large flow of R&D Community funding to the peripheral
countries, representing in some countries such as Greece already 60% of total business enterprise
R&D efforts, will bring about an indigenous S&T development in those countries. Finally, the
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question can be raised whether the desire for European networking, collaboration and
coordination in the S&T area, is not reinforcing what are already national strongholds in S&T,
rather than raising the overall level of European S&T.
 
At a more general level, the question can be raised whether European technology policies should
not be fundamentally redesigned. We would argue that within the emerging framework of a
European monetary union, it will be essential to have new technology policies aimed at
increasing mobility of researchers across Europe. Characteristic of European research (and in
particular publicly funded research) is indeed its fragmented nature and small country bias with
a multitude of relatively small research institutes being spread over a very widespread field of
different disciplines. 
A European technology policy might hence start to focus explicitly on the various barriers to such
mobility. One might think e.g. of an explicitly mobility related European status for European
expatriate research personnel comparable to the status of European civil servants and providing
a common, harmonized social security, pension and fiscal system to such European researchers.
In emerging ‘Euroland’, labour market fragmentation particularly of high skilled labour
qualifications is likely to be most damaging for economic growth and competitiveness.
The need for European institutional development and learning to internalize R&D efforts might
hence take many different forms, going well beyond traditional forms or arguments about
industrial technology clustering, but including more than ever a specific international European
dimension, so as to enhance the missing economies of scope and scale. In this respect an
international, open version of Coasean economics might give us some insights into the sort of
international European industry institutions likely to emerge to more fully exploit the gains from
joint European R&D. Now that EU integration is entering its ultimate economic and monetary
union phase, we conclude that EU policy should start to reassess the needs for a new technology
policy institutional framework more directly aimed at removing the remaining European barriers
to knowledge distribution. 
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